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ABSTRACT
EXCESS CAPACITY IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY
ELI˙F BI˙KE ÖSÜN
Master Thesis, June 2017
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Eren I˙nci
Keywords: Mixed Oligopoly; Capacity Choice; Excess Capacity; Price Competition;
Parking.
I consider a two-stage mixed duopoly game where a public firm proposes a capacity allocation
and a private firm has the option to either accept the allocation and enter the market or reject
it and not enter the market in the first stage and the firms engage in a price competition
in the second stage. The private firm aims to maximize its profit whereas the public firm
aims to maximize social welfare. I show that while the private firm operates at full capacity,
the public firm bears excess capacity in the equilibrium even though capacity investment is
costly. The theoretical model is highly relevant to the parking literature where the public
firm represents on-street parking and the private firm represents a private parking garage. My
finding provides alternative rationale for the advocated vacancy rate at on-street parking in
the parking literature.
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ÖZET
KARMA OLIGOPOLDE ATIL KAPASI˙TE
ELI˙F BI˙KE ÖSÜN
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Haziran 2017
Tez Danıs¸manı: Doç. Dr. Eren I˙nci
Anahtar Kelimeler: Karma Oligopol; Kapasite Seçimi; Atıl Kapasite; Fiyat Rekabeti;
Parklanma.
Bu çalıs¸mada, ilk as¸amada kamu firmasının her iki firma için bir kapasite alokasyonu yapıp
özel firmanın kendisine teklif edilen kapasiteyi kabul ettig˘i veya redderek marketten çık-
tıg˘ı, ikinci as¸amada ise firmaların fiyat rekabetine girdikleri iki as¸amalı karma bir oligopol
piyasası modeli ele alınmaktadır. Özel firma karını maksimize etmeyi amaçlarken, kamu fir-
masının amacı toplumsal refahı maksimize etmektir. Bu çalıs¸mada kapasite yatırımı maliyetli
olmasına rag˘men, Nash Dengesi’nde özel firma tam kapasitede çalıs¸ırken, kamu firmasının
atıl kapasiteye sahip oldug˘u gösterilmektedir. Çalıs¸mada kullanılan kuramsal model, kamu
firmasının yolüstü park yerine ve özel firmanın ise özel otoparka kars¸ılık geldig˘i parklanma
yazınıyla yakından alakalıdır. Bu çalıs¸mada elde edilen sonuç, park literatüründe savunulan
yolüstü park yerinde bos¸ yer tezine alternatif bir açıklama sunmaktadır.
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1. Introduction
Analyzing capacity choice of firms in oligopolies has been drawing increasing attention
throughout the years. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show the equivalence of a single-stage
Cournot duopoly and a two-stage game in which firms first choose capacities to later engage
in a price competition; their finding indicate that none of the firms choose excess capacity in
the equilibrium. Yet, excess capacity is commonly observed in the market. In pure oligopoly
markets, existence of excess capacity has been justified by modifying the originial model to
account for additional factors. Benoit and Krishna (1987) show that firms generally have
excess capacity in equilibrium as a punishment device when the price game is repeated in-
finitely. Deneckere and Kovenock (1996) allow for efficiency differences between firms and
reach the conclusion that low cost firm can build excess capacity to place its less efficient ri-
val out of the market. Allen et al. (2000) show that incumbent firms use capacity as a barrier
to entry and some of this capacity can be left unused at the equilibrium. The literature on
capacity choice of firms in a mixed oligopoloy environment, on the other hand, is not as rich
as the pure oligopoly market. The focus of this paper is to analyze the capacity choice in a
mixed duopoly under price competition.
There are contradicting results on the capacity choice of public firms in a mixed duopoly
under Cournot competition. Lu and Poddar (2005) and Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) assume
that firms have a U-shaped cost function that punishes production level deviations from ca-
pacity and find that public firm chooses under capacity in the equilibrium. Wen and Sasaki
(2001), on the other hand, reach a contradicting conclusion in a mixed oligopoly under re-
peated Cournot competition in which cost function is not assumed to have a U-shape. Capac-
ity choice in a mixed oligopoly under Bertrand competition has been studied less thoroughly.
Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2007) show that public firm chooses excess capacity when goods
are substitutes in a mixed oligopoly under price competition where firms bear a U-shaped
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cost function. Merrill and Schneider (1966) show that when one of the many firms that are
operating below capacity under price competition is replaced by a social welfare maximizer,
private firms change their prices to fully utilize their capacity, while the public firm operates
at less than full capacity at equilibrium; this model does not make additional assumptions
on the cost function, but it examines the production level choices of firms with exogenous
capacities rather than examining the capacity choices of firms.
I aim to analyze the capacity choice of a public firm in a mixed duopoly under price
competition using a simple model without complex assumptions and show that the public firm
chooses excess capacity in the equilibrium. I consider a two-stage game in which capacity
choice is followed by the pricing decision. In the first stage, the public firm chooses its
capacity and proposes a capacity for the private firm; the private firm can accept this capacity
and bear the associated capacity cost to get the equilibrium profit or reject it to make zero
profit by not entering the market. In the second stage, the firms engage in a price competition.
Even though the capacity investment is costly, the public firm chooses excess capacity in the
equilibrium, which serves as a device to achieve higher social welfare through realization of
lower prices in the equilibrium.
The theoretical model used throughout this paper can potentially be applied to the park-
ing literature. According to Shoup (2006), cruising for parking accounts for between 8 to 74
percent of the traffic in downtown areas, which can be eliminated by adjusting the price of
parking to ensure the existence of one vacant parking spot per block at on-street parking.
Government intervention to increase the price of a public service can be problematic due to
political concerns. This model shows that excess capacity can result as a market outcome,
rather than a government intervention, when the public firm has the power to determine the
capacity levels of itself and the private firm. When planning a new urban area, authorities
can allocate on-street and private parking capacities in such a way that Shoup (2006)’s rec-
ommendation of always having a vacant parking spot per block can be achieved as a Nash
Equilibrium of the price competition between the public and private firm.
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2. The Model
I consider a mixed duopoly market consisting of a profit-maximizing private firm and
a social welfare-maximizing public firm that are producing homogenous goods. The demand
function D : [0,1]→ [0,1] is
D(p) = 1− p. (1)
Firms have the same efficiency; for simplicity, I assume that production costs are zero
for both firms up to their capacities. Capacity is costly to be installed and firms cannot
produce more than their capacities. I assume the capacity cost function c : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) to
be of the form
c(x) = (x2)/k, (2)
where x denotes the capacity, while k is a positive constant and taken as k = 10. Capacities
of the firms, xi ∈ [0,1], are discrete with 0.01 increments, while their prices, pi ∈ [0,1], are
continuous.
Firms engage in a two-stage competition. In the first stage, the public firm chooses
x1 and x2, capacities of the private firm and the public firm, respectively. The private firm
can accept or reject the capacity proposed by the public firm, x1. The private firm gets the
equilibrium payoff if it accepts the offer and bears the associated capacity cost, c(x1), whereas
it makes zero profit if it rejects the offer and doesn’t enter the market. Note that in case the
private firm doesn’t accept the public firm’s capacity allocation in the first stage, its capacity
equals zero in the second stage of the game. In the second stage, firms choose their prices, p1
and p2, and engage in a Bertrand competition. If firm i charges a price lower than the price
of firm j, it faces the whole market demand. Since firms are capacity constrained, low price
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firm’s sales are either equal to D(pi) or xi, whichever is smaller in this case. If prices of two
firms are equal, then firms share the market demand up to their capacities; any unsatisfied
demand due to a firm’s insufficient capacity is transferred to the other firm if its capacity
permits. Finally, if firm i charges a price higher than the price of firm j, it faces the residual
demand in case residual demand is non-negative. Formally, sales of each firm, zi, is
zi =

min{xi,1− pi} pi < p j
min{xi,max{1−pi2 ,1− x j− pi}} pi = p j
min{xi,max{0,1− x j− pi}} pi > p j
. (3)
The private firm is trying to maximize its profit, pi , which is equal to its revenue minus
its capacity cost,
pi = p1z1− c(x1), (4)
while the public firm is trying to maximize social welfare, SW , which is calculated by sub-
stracting total capacity costs incurred from total surplus,
SW =
∫ z1+z2
0
(1− z)dz− c(x1)− c(x2). (5)
In the second stage of the game, each firm selects a price to maximize its corresponding
objective function given capacities of both firms. Following Cremer et al. (1989), I assume
that the public firm has the power to enforce the equilibrium with higher social welfare in case
there exists multiple Nash Equilibria in the second stage. In the first stage, the public firm
uses backward induction to choose the capacity levels that yield the highest social welfare.
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3. Pricing Game
In the second stage of the game, capacities are known by both firms. Given capacities,
the private firm chooses the price that maximizes its profit, while the public firm chooses the
price that maximizes social welfare. Section 3.1 calculates the possible best responses of the
firms under different scenarios and Section 3.2 shows the best responses that coincide.
3.1. Best Response Analysis
The firms’ best response functions in general form are
BR1(p2,x1,x2) = argmax
p1
(pi|p2,x1,x2) (6)
BR2(p1,x1,x2) = argmax
p2
(SW |p1,x1,x2), (7)
where BR1 (BR2) is the price that maximizes private firm’s profit (social welfare) given ca-
pacities, x1 and x2, and the public (private) firm’s price, p2 (p1).
The private firm’s best response function can be written as
BR1(p2,x1,x2) =

pR p2 < pu
p2 pu ≤ p2 ≤ p∗
∅ max{pu, p∗}< p2 ≤ pM
pM p2 > pM
, (8)
where pR= argmax
p1
(min{x1,max{0,1−x2− p1}}× p1) is the price that maximizes the profit
when the private firm faces residual-demand, pu is derived from min{x1,1− pu} × pu =
min{x1,max{0,1−x2− pR}}× pR and is the threshold price such that when p2 > pu, private
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firm is better off by undercutting the public firm, p∗ is derived from (1− p∗)/2 = x1 and
is the threshold price such that when p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗, the private firm’s sales is bounded by
its capacity, and pM = argmax
p1
(min{x1,1− p1}× p1) is the threshold price such that when
p2 > pM, the private firm acts as a monopoly.
The public firm’s best response correspondence becomes
BR2(p1,x1,x2) =

[0,1− x1− x2] p1 ≤ 1− x1− x2
[0, p1] 1− x1− x2 < p1 < 1−max{x1,x2}
[0,1] 1− x1 ≤ p1 ≤ 1− x2
[0,1− x2] p1 > 1− x2
. (9)
Section 3.1.1 examines the best response function of the private firm for different prices
charged by the public firm and Section 3.1.2 examines the best response correspondence of
the public firm for different prices charged by the private firm.
3.1.1. Analysis of the private firm’s best response
When p2 ≤ 1−x1−x2, public firm’s sales is equal to its capacity no matter what p2 is.
Even when the public firm charges a price higher than the private firm’s price, the minimum
possible demand it can face is 1− x1− p2 ≥ x2. Under this condition, the private firm faces
residual demand for any p1 ∈ [0,1] and its best response is to charge pR by definition. Figure
1 shows the profit of the private firm when p2 ≤ 1− x1− x2 for different levels of p1. The
private firm’s profit, pi , is represented in the vertical axis, while its price, p1, is represented in
the horizontal axis. As can be seen in Figure 1, the private firm’s profit is maximized when it
charges p1 = pR in this case.
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Figure 1: Profit of the private firm when p2 ≤ 1− x1− x2
When 1− x1− x2 < p2 < pu, price of the public firm is below the pu threshold and as
shown in Figure 2, the private firm is again better off by facing residual demand rather than
undercutting the public firm.
Lemma 1. When p2 < pu, the best response of the private firm is to charge pR.
Figure 2: Profit of the private firm when 1− x1− x2 < p2 < pu
When pu ≤ p2 ≤ p∗, the price set by the public firm is above the pu threshold and as
shown in Figure 3, the private firm has a higher profit when it undercuts the public firm’s
price rather than facing the residual demand. Moreover, since the price of the public firm is
below the p∗ threshold, the private firm’s capacity is binding when p1 ≤ p2. Given that it is
optimal for the private firm to charge p1 ≤ p2 in this case and that the sales of the private firm
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is equal to x1 for any p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗, profit is maximized when p1 = p2.
Lemma 2. When pu ≤ p2 ≤ p∗, the best response of the private firm is to charge the public
firm’s price, p2.
Figure 3: Profit of the private firm when pu ≤ p2 ≤ p∗
When max{pu, p∗} < p2 ≤ pM, the price of the public firm is above the pu threshold
and as shown in Figure 4, the private firm has a higher profit when it undercuts the public
firm rather than facing residual demand. Moreover, since the price of the public firm is above
the p∗ threshold, the private firm’s capacity is not binding at p1 = p2. Given that it is optimal
for the private firm to charge p1 ≤ p2 in this case and that it has sufficient capacity to increase
its profit by charging a price slightly less than p2, the private firm’s best response is not
well-defined.
Lemma 3. When max{pu, p∗} < p2 ≤ pM, the best response of the private firm is not well-
defined.
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Figure 4: Profit of the private firm when max{pu, p∗}< p2 ≤ pM
When p2 > pM, as seen in Figure 5, the private firm’s profit is maximized when it
charges the monopoly price, pM.
Lemma 4. When p2 > pM, the best response of the private firm is to charge pM.
Figure 5: Profit of the private firm when p2 > pM
3.1.2. Analysis of the public firm’s best response
At this stage, since capacity costs are already incurred, social welfare increases as the
total output increases. Figure 6 shows social welfare when p1≤ 1−x1−x2 for different levels
of p2. Social welfare, SW , is represented in the vertical axis, while the public firm’s price,
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p2, is represented in the horizontal axis. When p1 ≤ 1− x1− x2, charging p2 ≤ 1− x1− x2
results in both firms selling at their capacities, which is the maximum total output achievable.
Lemma 5: When p1 ≤ 1− x1− x2, the best response of the public firm is to charge any
p2 ≤ 1− x1− x2.
Figure 6: Social welfare when p1 ≤ 1− x1− x2
When 1−x1−x2 < p1 < 1−max{x1,x2}, as shown in Figure 7, maximum total output
is reached when the public firm charges p2 ≤ p1. When p2 < p1, the public firm faces
1− p2 > 1− p1 > x2, meaning that the public firm is capacity constrained for this price
interval and z2 = x2. Then, the private firm faces 1− x2 − p1 < x1, meaning that it has
sufficient capacity to meet the residual demand. Thus, total output is 1− p1 in this interval
when p2 < p1. When p2 = p1, total demand is 1− p1 < x1 + x2, meaning that there exists
sufficient capacity in the market to meet demand; so, total output is the same as the case when
p2 < p1. Total output, hence social welfare, starts to decrease as the price of the public firm
exceeds the price of the private firm. When p2 > p1, the private firm faces 1− p1 > x1, so
z1 = x1. Then, public firm faces 1− x1− p2 < x2+ p1− p2 < x2, meaning z2 = 1− x1− p2.
When p2 > p1, total output is less than the total output reached when p2 ≤ p1 since 1− p2 <
1− p1.
Lemma 6: When 1− x1− x2 < p1 < 1−max{x1,x2}, the best response of the public firm is
to charge any p2 ≤ p1.
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Figure 7: Social welfare when 1− x1− x2 < p1 < 1−max{x1,x2}
When 1− x1 < p1 < 1− x2, the public firm is indifferent between charging any p2 ∈
[0,1], as shown in Figure 8. In this interval, total output is 1− p1 independent from the value
of p2. When p1 < p2, the private firm faces 1− p1 < x1 and meets the whole market demand
by itself. When p1 = p2, firms share the market demand; even if there is any unsatisfied
demand due the public firm’s capacity constraint, the private firm is guaranteed to satisfy the
leftover demand since x1 > 1− p1. Finally, when p1 > p2, the public firm faces 1− p2 >
1− p1 > x2 and sells z2 = x2. Then, the private firm faces 1− x2− p1 ≤ 1− p1 < x1. Hence,
total market output is 1− p1 for all p2 ∈ [0,1].
Figure 8: Social welfare when 1− x1 < p1 < 1− x2
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Lemma 7: When 1− x1 < p1 < 1− x2, the best response of the public firm is to charge
any p2 ∈ [0,1].
When p1 > 1− x2, social welfare is maximized when p2 ≤ 1− x2, as shown in Figure
9. In this range, p2 ≤ 1− x2 < p1, hence the public firm faces 1− p2 ≥ x2, meaning that
z2 = x2 and the private firm faces the residual demand. Instead, if the public firm charges
p2 > 1− x2, total market output is z ≤ 1−min{p1, p2} < x2, which is less than the sales of
the public firm alone when p2 ≤ 1− x2.
Lemma 8: When p1 > 1−x2, the best response of the public firm is to charge any p2≤ 1−x2.
Figure 9: Social welfare when p1 > 1− x2
3.2. Types of Nash Equilibria
In the second stage of the game, I show that three types of Nash Equilibria may emerge.
3.2.1. Residual-Maximizing Equilibrium
Residual-Maximizing Equilibrium is the equilibrium in which p1 = pR and p2 ∈ [0, pu]
are best responses to each other. In the Residual Maximizing Equilibrium, the public firm
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always sells at capacity, while the private firm may have excess capacity. Since p1 = pR
and p2 ∈ [0, pu] are always best responses to each other, this type of equilibrium always
exists. The best responses of the firms in the Residual-Maximizing Equilibrium is illustrated
in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Best responses in the Residual-Maximizing Equilibrium
Showing that p1 = pR is the private firm’s best response to p2 ∈ [0, pu] is trivial, as the
private firm’s best response is to charge p1 = pR when p2 ≤ pu. To show that p2 ∈ [0, pu]
is a best response for the public firm when p1 = pR, I will revisit Section 3.1.2 for the case
p1 = pR.
If pR= p1≤ 1−x1−x2, the public firm’s best response is to charge p2 ∈ [0,1−x1−x2].
Definition of pR = argmax
p1
(min{x1,max{0,1− x2− p1}}× p1) combined with the fact that
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x1 > 0 and 1−x2− p1≥ x1 results in pR= argmax
p1
(x1× p1) in this region. Maximum possible
price to satisfy the given conditions makes p1 = pR = 1− x1− x2. Then, public firm’s best
response is equivalent to charging p2 ∈ [0, pR]. By definition, pu ≤ pR; thus, p2 ∈ [0, pu] is a
best response to p1 = pR.
If 1−x1−x2 < p1 = pR< 1−max{x1,x2}, the best response of the public firm becomes
p2 ∈ [0, p1]. Since pR = p1 ≥ pu, p2 ∈ [0, pu] is a best response to p1 = pR.
If 1−x1≤ p1 = pR≤ 1−x2, public firm is indifferent between charging any p2 ∈ [0,1];
thus, p2 ∈ [0, pu] is a best response to p1 = pR.
Finally, p1 = pR > 1− x2 is not possible. Charging pR > 1− x2 results in the pri-
vate firm making zero sales, while charging p1 < 1− x2 results in strictly positive revenues;
contradicting with the definition of pR = argmax
p1
(min{x1,max{0,1− x2− p1}}× p1).
p1 = pR and p2 ∈ [0, pu] are best responses to each other in every possible case; thus
this type of Nash Equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 1. {p1 = pR, p2 ∈ [0, pu] } is a Nash Equilibrium.
3.2.2. Follower Equilibrium
Follower Equilibrium is the equilibrium in which p1 = p2 and p2 ∈ [pu,min{p∗,1−
x2}] are best responses to each other. I call this equilibrium as the Follower Equilibrium,
since the private firm’s profit is maximized when it mimics the public firm’s price in this
equilibrium. The best responses of the firms in the Follower Equilibrium is shown in Figure
11. In the Follower Equilibrium, the private firm always operates at full capacity, while
the public firm always has excess capacity. The excess capacity of the public firm acts as
an incentive for the private firm to charge lower prices and operate at full capacity. Had
the public firm not have this excess capacity, the private firm would have an incentive to
deviate to a higher price; when the public firm is capacity constrained, it no longer has the
strategic power to lower the sales of the private firm by charging a lower price. The follower
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equilibrium can only exist when p∗ ≥ pu > 0. By the definition of p∗, this indicates that
excess capacity can not exist when x1 ≥ 0.5.
Showing that p1 = p2 is the private firm’s best response to pu≤ p2≤ p∗ is trivial, as the
private firm’s best response is to charge p1 = p2 when pu≤ p2≤ p∗. Additionally, notice that
p2 = p1 is always in the public firm’s best response correspondence given that p2 ≤ 1− x2,
which indicates that p2 ∈ [pu,min{p∗,1− x2}] is in the best response correspondence of the
public firm for p1 = p2 ∈ [pu,min{p∗,1−x2}]. Hence, p1 = p2 and p2 ∈ [pu,min{p∗,1−x2}]
are best responses to each other given that p∗ ≥ pu > 0.
Proposition 2. {p1 = p2, p2 ∈ [pu,min{p∗,1− x2}] } is a Nash Equilibrium.
Figure 11: Best responses in the Follower Equilibrium
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3.2.3. Monopoly Equilibrium
Monopoly Equilibrium is the equilibrium in which p1 = pM and p2 ∈ (pM,1] are best
responses to each other. The best responses of the firms in the Monopoly Equilibrium is
illustrated in Figure 12. In the Monopoly Equlibrium, the private firm acts as a monopoly.
The private firm may or may not have excess capacity, while the public firm always has
excess capacity as its sales always equals to zero. This type of an equilibrium only exists if
1− x2 ≥ pM. By the definition of pM, this indicates that x2 ≤ x1 must hold for the monopoly
equilibrium to exist.
Figure 12: Best responses in the Monopoly Equilibrium
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Showing that p1 = pM is the private firm’s best response to p2 > pM is trivial, as the
private firm’s best response is to charge p1 = pM when p2 > pM. To see that p2 ∈ (pM,1] is a
best response to p1 = pM, consider the two possible values of pM separately. If x1 > 0.5, this
indicates that pM = 0.5. Additionally, 1−x2 ≥ pM; hence, 1−x1 < pM ≤ 1−x2 holds in this
case. On the other hand, if x1 ≤ 0.5, then pM = 1− x1. In this case, 1− x1 = pM ≤ 1− x2.
In either of the cases, the public firm is indifferent between charging any p2 ∈ [0,1]. So,
p2 ∈ (pM,1] and p1 = pM are best responses to each other when 1− x2 ≥ pM.
Proposition 3. {p1 = pM, p2 ∈ (pM,1]} is a Nash Equilibrium.
4. Capacity Game
In the first stage of the game, the public firm chooses x1 and x2 to maximize social
welfare. In the game where xi ∈ [0,1] with 0.01 increments, the resulting game table is a
100×100 table, which is left out from the paper for spacial constraints and is available upon
request. Table 1 contains the 10×10 compacted version of the original game. The capacities
that maximize the social welfare, i.e. the capacities chosen by the public firm, are x1 = 0.35
and x2 = 0.53 when capacities are discrete with 0.01 increments.
In this stage, the private firm can either accept the capacity level allocated by the
public firm or it can reject the offer and not enter the market. When the public firm of-
fers to allocate the capacities as x1 = 0.35 and x2 = 0.53, the private firm accepts this ca-
pacity allocation, since it makes a positive profit when it decides to enter the market.
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5. Results
Combining the capacity choice and the best response analysis explained in Sections 3
and 4 with the assumption that the public firm has the power to enforce the equilibrium which
has the highest social welfare when multiple equilibria exists, the resulting equilibrium is a
Follower Equilibrium in which x1 = 0.35, x2 = 0.53, p1 = p2 = pu = 0.158, z1 = 0.35, and
z2 = 0.492. In the equilibrium, the private firm operates at full capacity while the public
firm has unused capacity. Notice that the public firm chooses to over-invest in capacity, even
though capacity investment is costly. The intuition behind this is that the public firm can
enforce a lower equilibrium price using this extra capacity as a threat. As the capacity of
the public firm increases, profit of the private firm when it faces residual demand decreases;
hence, the private firm has a stronger incentive to cooperate with the public firm when the
public firm has higher capacity.
One thing to note is that the Nash Equilibrium would be different if the private firm
were to choose x1 in the first stage of the game, rather that the public firm choosing both
capacities. In this scenario, there would be two Nash Equilibria; x1 = 0.13, x2 = 0.72, which
I call Equilibrium A and x1 = 0.12, x2 = 0.73, which I call Equilibrium B. Both of these
equilibria are Residual Maximizing Equilibria and none of the firms have excess capacity
in the equilibrium. An important finding is that both of the firms are worse off when firms
choose their own capacities rather than the public firm choosing capacities for both firms.
In the original setting where the public firm chooses both x1 and x2, the equilibrium profit
and social welfare are pi = 0.043 and SW = 0.447; whereas the equilibrium profit and social
welfare are pi = 0.018 (pi = 0.017) and SW = 0.435 (SW = 0.434) in Equilibrium A (Equi-
librium B) when firms choose their own capacities. Hence, not only the public firm, but also
the private firm is better off by letting the public firm choose both of the capacities in the first
stage.
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6. Conclusions
I consider a two-stage mixed oligopoly model in which the public firm chooses capac-
ities on behalf of both firms in the first stage and firms engage in a price competition in the
second stage. The private firm has the option to accept the capacity chosen by the public firm
on behalf of the private firm and get the equilibrium profit or to reject the allocation and not
enter the market. Assuming that the public firm has the power to enforce the equilibrium with
the higher social welfare in case there are multiple equilibria in any stage of the game, the
private firm accepts the capacity allocation and operates at full capacity, while the public firm
has excess capacity in the resulting equilibrium. Moreover, both firms are better off compared
to the model in which firms choose their own capacities in the first stage of the game.
The theoretical model used in this paper is suitable to be applied to the parking liter-
ature. Parking market can be considered as a mixed oligopoly; usually, on-street parking is
operated by a social welfare maximizer public firm, while off-street parking is operated by
private garages. It is reasonable to assume that the public firm is the decisive party for the
on-street and off-street parking capacities allowed. Furthermore, even when the public firm
has the power to manipulate prices, this may be impractical for political reasons. In a setting
where the government decides on the on-street and off-street parking capacities in the city-
planning phase, there will be unused on-street parking capacity in the equilibrium when the
public and the private firm engage in a price competition afterwards.
Shoup (2006) advocates adjusting the parking prices to ensure the existence of one va-
cant parking spot per block. Arnott (2014) recently shows that the optimal vacancy rate may
be larger or smaller depending on the traffic level of the on-street parking location. In these
studies, the optimal vacancy rate is calculated with the aim of minimizing the congestion rate
caused by cruising for parking. I show that even when congestion and search costs are not ac-
counted for, there will be unused on-street parking capacity in the equilibrium of this setting;
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furthermore, the excess capacity is obtained without government intervention on pricing.
Potential extensions to the model to reach more genralizable results are allowing for
continuous capacities, relaxing the rule on picking the equilibrium that yields the higher
social welfare, and having multiple private firms. These are left for future research.
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